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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

) Supreme Court Docket W35543-2008
(Custer County C a s e #CV 2005-9 1 )
)
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, )

DAVID NELSON a n d LOY PEHRSON, e t al,

i

I

v.
BIG LOST RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT;
Board of Directors, RICHARD REYNOLDS,
CHARLIE HUGGINS, KENT HARWOOD,
JOEL ANDERSON, M. MARX HINTZE,
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF \WATER RESOURCES,
a n d DAVID R. TUTHILL, JR., Director,
Defendants-CounterclaimantsCrossdefendanis-Reswndents.
and
ROBERT WADDOUPS, e t al, JAY
PEARSON, e t al,

F

Intervenors-Counterclaimants
Crossclaimants-Respondents.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR CUSTER COUNTY
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
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Ill. ARGUMENI
A.

Each Respondent attempts to evade the dispositive, substantive issue in
this case, whether the District has the power to ignore the judicial
apportionment of water, which specifically and automatically occurs at
the reservoir.
The great white elephant in the room the Respondents decline to

acknowledge, even though they admit an ldaho irrigation district has only the
powers conferred by statute or necessarily implied, is the 1936 Decree, and
specifically its apportioning all of the district's storage water to individual
consumers 6t the reservoir. In their misguided attempts to argue the Big Lost
River Irrigation District (hereinafter"District") has statutory discretion to equitably
distribute water, they ignore the undeniable fact that, by decree, the only
water available for distribution from the reservoir has already been divided
among the consumers. Rll. p. 51 -52.
In short, and for reasons further explained below, Respondents ignore
the law of Title 43, Chapter 4 of the ldaho Code, which provides districts only
have the powers that are judicially decreed to them when an irrigation district
is created or reformed under that Chapter. Also, Respondents ignore the
unambiguous law that the apportionment is conclusive of all matters
considered in the proceedings. American Falls Reservoir District v. Thrall, 39
ldaho 105, 130, 228, 236 ( 1 924); ldaho Code $43-406 (any reopening of the
case "shall not be considered as authorizing the rehearing of the matter
theretofore heard and decided"]. An irrigation district has no power to undo

the judicial apportionment so that it can allocate conveyance losses without
respecting the mandated apportionment to individual properties.
In 1936, the District was reformed and judicially approved so that each
of the individuals would be given his or her "cup" of water, as measured in the
reservoir. Each cup of water leaving the reservoir is apportioned to an
individual, and the District has no power to take water from one individual's
cup to give to another individual -- period, The District, in hindsight, thinks it
might be more fair, or more equitable, to dip into the cup of every user in
equal amounts, rather than have those who lose more of their cup during
conveyance through the river sustain that loss individually. Those ideas are
completely beside the point. The District simply lacks the power to do that.
Intervenors would have the Court think otherwise; they know of no other
irrigation district, other than the Big Lost River Irrigation District, that allocates
based on a measurement of water in the reservoir, as opposed to an amount
delivered at their downstream headgate. Appellants submit that is exactly the
point.
In this case, in the 19301s,the voters, consumers, District, and Court all
decided to divide and measure the cup in the reservoir, not at the
downstream headgates. They did this knowing the river channel incurs
significant amounts of shrink in the miles below the reservoir. Under I.C. 543-

406, and its predecessor statute which is substantially identical, that decision
cannot and should not be revisited
B.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the District may lawfully
urldercut the original judicial apportionment of water to its consumers
Respondents argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on two

grounds, each of which lacks merit:
1.

No one seeks to readjudicafe any wafer right, which would confe~
iurisdiction on the SRBA Court.

The District contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
Appellants are seeking to re-adjudicate a water right. There is no merit to this
accusation. The District simply fails to distinguish between its own obligation to
follow the 1936 Decree and deliver apportioned water and the notion that a
water right may have more than one point of diversion, or more accurately
point of re-diversion, after it is diverted into the reservoir and becomes
apportioned.

2.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required because
IDWR's Rules are not at issue.

The District also erroneously contends there is some exhaustion
requirements because the river-by-reachrules are implicated. What they fail
to acknowledge is that the rules, as the affidavit of Mr. Shaw explains, were
implemented in about 1994 in order to preserve the requirements of the 1936
Decree. R. p. 142. In other words, the significance of the rules is that iDWR,
and the District which participated in the rulemaking process, recognized that

shrink had to be accounted for in each significant reach of the river, and not
universally. In other words, while Respondents say there are no significant
issues of f a d , the affidavits clearly demonstrate that Appellants' version, i.e.
apportionment in the reservoir, was an ongoing issue that everybody,
including the District, understood to be resolved in 1994 by the rule mandating
the allocation of conveyance loss by river reach. See Tr. p. 377-379.
In sum, the rules and their negotiation are significant evidence that
consumers were continuing to insist on reductions only for the actual shrinkage
incurred in the delivery, and not universaliy. This evidence fundamentally
undercuts Mr. Reynolds' assertions that there has been some form of universal
shrink or pre-shrinkage formula since the 1930s.
C.

The district court appropriately reconsidered the claims, as it had
discretion to do to get to the merits of the case.
Respondents also contend that the various amendments of the

pleadings and request for reconsideration are inappropriate. They fail to point
out the District Judge fundamentally disagreed. He stated during the last
hearing that he was aware of his discretion with regard to the timeliness of
amendments and his ability to reconsider.

Pi-,p. 374-375. He chose to allow

the proceedings to go forward indicating he preferred a decision on the
merits. Respondents have not shown legal error or an abuse of discretion.

D.

Respondents' other assertions lack merit.
Respondents have made various other assertions: somehow they claim

the absence of language specifically discussing conveyance loss below the
reservoir extinguishes the judicial apportionment within the reservoir. The water
does not lose its apportioned character when taken from the reservior. They
also contend there are various other jurisdictional or procedural errors such as
ci lack of standing or inappropriate pleadings. Each of fhese assertions lacks

merit as already discussed
To say Appellants are not owners of property entitled to receive water
from the Disirict is, first, a new argument which cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Second, Appellants have pled they each are consumers of
water from the District, taking their allotments above the Blaine diversion
structure, and being deprived of their allotment. R. p. 75; 78-79
To say Appellants lack standing, or that the issue of universal shrink has
not been properly raised, is simply to contradict the very result the intervenors
would like to have upheld through the lower court's stipulated decree to
mandate universal shrink. If it was not an issue, then it was erroneous for the
disirict court to enter a decree in that regard.
E.
The 1936 Decree apportions all water to individual consumers once it
enters the reservoir, and the District has no discretion to "un-apportion" or
otherwise aggregate the water which has already been judicially divided as it
leaves the reservoir.

A large part of Respondents' arguments focus on the assertion that the

I936 Decree does not speak in specific terms about how conveyance losses
below the reservoir shall be charged to individual consumers. This misses the
poinl. Once the water enters the reservoir it is automatically apportioned by
the judicial decree. Thus, the real question is how is ii that the District purports
to have derived powers to un-apportion water when it leaves the reservoir?
What it must deliver under the decree is apportioned water. What is not
sanctioned by statute or decree is some magic wand that empowers the
District to reapportion, or more accurately, do away with apportionment, while
the water is in the river. The complete hypocrisy of such a position is disclosed
by the fact that the District admits that once water leaves the river, the
conveyance losses in the canal must be borne by those people on the canal.
Universal shrink is nothing more than an attempt to ignore the 1936 Decree.
F.

Universal shrink is the antithesis of apportioning at the reservoir.
As has already been pointed out, Respondents focus too much on the

position that the 1936 Findings and Decree do not address haw conveyance
he reservoir. The
fallacy of this argument is demonstrated by lniervenors' own assertions:
conveyance losses are not addressed because the water is already
apportioned and remains attached to the individual property owners from the
time it enters the reservoir until the time it arrives at their property or canal.

What the Decree and findings do is address how water is allocated if
there is extra water, short water, and even breaks in the canals. It also
addresses evaporation from the reservoir. In each instance it dictates an
adjustment to how much each consumer is entitled to, based on the
apportionment in the reservoir. Omitting reference to conveyance losses of
already apportioned water is not an oversight, but a practical recognition of
the fact the water was already divided amongst the consumers.
In sum, as Intervenors state, the Big Losf River lrrigafion District is unlike
any other, precisely because it apportions at the reservoir and not at the
headgates. It is not for this Court, nor any other, to second-guess that decision
that was made in the 1930s on a river named for the water it loses. This is
especially so when put in coniext: the reservoir and canals were bought and
reconfigured by the consumers in the 1930s because the irrigation project
simply lacked the water to be a successful irrigation project. That is precisely
why the I936 Decree and findings removed much land from the project and
only provide storage water to those who already have in stream flow rights.
More practically speaking, the universal shrink scheme is bad for each user in
the sense that it has apprised each consumer of the ability to manage his
farming operations because he cannot control when or how much of his
apportioned water he may receive. With universal shrink, the amount of
apportioned water which will be consumed on any given day depends

entirely on who else is using water. If one of the Mackay Users asks for his water
on a given day, instead of knowing how much he will be charged based on
the conveyance loss to his property, under the universal shrink scheme he may
lose half or more of his water simply because people in Arco happened to be
using water on that day. To suggest the voters bought into such an arbitrary
scheme is to underestimate their practicality.
The far better interpretation is to read ihe 1936 decree just as if's written.
Apportionment is in the reservoir. Each consumer is responsible for
conveyance losses of his cup of water, and each consumer can make the
economic decision about whether to improve a part of the river channel,
according to Chapter 4, Title 43, based on what benefits he and his neighbors
on that reach might receive. Also under that Chapter, the cost of paying for
those benefits is borne by those, and only those who do benefit in fact.

G.

The statutory scheme fixes the judicial apportionment, leaving it to
those, like Intervenors, who would benefit from later building other
canals or otherwise avoiding river shrink, to pay for such improvements.
As just mentioned, when Chapter 4 is read as awhole, it is clear that

those who benefit from improvements should pay for them. This attempt to
invoke a universal shrink ignores the fundamental fact that ail water leaving
the reservoir is already apportioned as well as the legislative decision to put
the burden of paying for subsequent improvements on those, and only on
those, who would benefit. The Mackay Users derive no benefit and in fact

sustain substantial losses in the amount of water they receive if the District is
allowed to invoke universal shrink.
H.

The District's Bylaws admit the water is apportioned at the reservoir and
each consumer has the right to benefit.
The District would have the Court believe it repealed Section 5 of its

Bylaws (R. Vol. ll., p. 99)in 1964 where they say that "any wafer belonging to
him [a consumer] by such storage right or correct flow right under said
assessment and apportionment of benefits, in the District's Reservoir. ..." is
entitled to the delivery of such water. The District would have the Court
believe that the language in that section deletes the entire paragraph, not just
the part in brackets. Appellants submit the Court can read the entire set of
bylaws (RII. p. 99-10]),which makes it obvious that deletions to the bylaws only
apply to practice portions. In short, the District is attempting to take part of the
cups of water belonging to Appellants, and will even go so far as to make a
preposterous argument that they have somehow had the power and used
that power to defeat the consumers rights under the 1936 Decree. Such a
position clearly takes legitimate argument to an absurd and frivolous position.
I.

IDWR's Rules follow the statutory scheme by requiring conveyance losses
in the river to be accounied for on a reach basis, so losses are
accounted for based on where each lserson diverts water from the river.

Respondents also attempt to avoid the real issue of judicial
apportionment by contending that IDWR's rules do not compel the District to

account for conveyance losses according the actual losses occurred in each
reach of the river. Once again, this is a red herring.
As David Shaw states in his Affidavit, R. p. 142, the ruies were negotiated

to preserve the equitable distribution by preserving the allocation of delivery
losses on a reach basis. This is evidence consistent with the 1936 Decree. It is
contrary to Respondents' assertions that the District has some power to
implement universal shrink. IDWR's authority under I.C. $42-801 is to account
for water in the river, based on " . . . the persons and ditches entitled to its use"
There is simply no authority for the proposition IDWR can abdicate that
statutory duty. Thus, the District's position that it can un-apportion water and
ignore IDWR's accounting of losses is all the more arbitrary.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the opening brief, Appellants
submit that the only power the District has is to deliver apportioned water. it
lacks any authority to un-apportion for the purposes of conveyance losses.
The 1936 Decree specifically mandates each consumer receive specific
amounts from the time the water enters the reservoir, which is the antithesis of
shared shrink down to headgates. This Court should uphold those rights of the
consumers, and award fees for the District's arbitrary atiempts to undo this
longstanding judicial apportionment.

r

Additionally, if the Court disagrees, ihere remain issues of fact about the
scope and intent of the decree, subsequent history, and the ruies as well as
their application to this case. Consequently, and in the alternative, the Court
shouid remand the case for a trial to decide the facts.
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Respectfuily subrnitied this -day of March, 2009.

Attorney for PlaintiffsCounterdefendants-Appellants
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